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Notes and Comments
Lynch v. Donnelly: One Giant Step Over the
Wall?
I. Introduction
In Lynch v. Donnelly,' the Supreme Court upheld the inclu-
sion of a nativity scene in a Christmas holiday display funded by
the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In reversing the district
and circuit court decisions, the Court's inquiry focused on the
creche in the context of the celebration of a national holiday,
Christmas, rather than on the scene's religious significance2 The
Court concluded that inclusion of the creche did not advance
religion more than other prior official acknowledgements of reli-
gion by all branches of government.3 In addition, the Court
stated that the display had a secular purpose, and that Pawtuck-
et had neither impermissibly advanced religion nor fostered ex-
cessive entanglement between religion and government as a con-
sequence of including a creche in its holiday display."
In a five to four decision,5 the Court appears to have contin-
ued a recent trend toward accommodation between church and
state. Indeed, the Court interprets the Constitution as "affirma-
tively [mandating] accommodation. '7 The Court explicitly re-
jected an interpretation requiring complete separation of church
1. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
2. Id. at 1362.
3. Id. at 1360-61.
4. Id. at 1365.
5. The plurality opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices
White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice O'Connor joined in the holding but filed her own
concurrence. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Brennan, and joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
6. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
7. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
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and state,8 thus repudiating the "wall between church and state"
approach articulated in previous decisions.'
Part II of this Note examines earlier establishment clause
cases and the recurrent themes that have emerged from these
decisions. Part III discusses the current standards and the
Lemon v. Kurtzman test,10 which has been used by the Court as
the standard to be applied in cases challenging state action as
violative of the establishment clause. Part IV sets out the facts
and lower court decision in Lynch v. Donnelly. Part V sets forth
the Supreme Court's decision. Part VI analyzes the plurality's
use of precedent and its national holiday rationale. Finally, this
Note concludes that the Lynch decision may have far reaching
consequences. First, the decision sanctions certain government
involvement with religious displays and religious institutions.
The scope of this sanction, however, is unclear. Second, the au-
thoritativeness of the Lemon test is substantially weakened by
the Court's reasoning. Third, given the weakened establishment
clause standard and the Court's reemphasis of its unwillingness
to be confined to any single test, it appears that future establish-
ment clause cases will be decided on a case by case basis.
II. Background
The Constitution guarantees that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . "..."' The search for the historic purpose
of this language has yielded inconclusive results." The United
8. Id.
9. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). See also infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
10. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 47-72 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Lemon test.
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
12. See L. TRmE, AmzmicAN CONsTrruvnONAL LAW 816 (1978). See also J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 1029 (2d ed. 1983). The authors all conclude
that a study of history reveals no clear meaning of the establishment clause.
Although it is true that many colonists fled religious persecution, their experiences
differed widely in the colonies. In Virginia, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led a
continuing fight against continued aid to religion. In other states, however, close ties
existed between church and state. Indeed, a number of states had established churches
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States Supreme Court, however, has attached great significance
to the views of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in defining
the historical purpose of the religious clauses and in fixing the
meaning of the establishment limitation."i Madison's view was
that both religion and government function best when each re-
mains independent of the other.1 4 Echoing this approach, Jeffer-
son wrote that the effect of the amendment was to establish "a
wall of separation between church and state."1 "
Three broad themes emerge from earlier Supreme Court
cases interpreting the establishment clause.' 6 One theme advo-
cates strict separation of church and state. 7 The second theme
urges that government remain neutral in religious matters. 8 Fi-
nally, more recent decisions imply a need for government accom-
until after the revolution. See J. NOWAK, supra, at 1030.
Some commentators have interpreted the establishment clause as a limitation on the
federal government's sovereignty over religious matters, thus leaving these matters to the
individual states. See G. GuNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1553
n.1 (10th ed. 1980); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 728 (1833); Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 11 MEM.
ST. U.L. REv. 151, 183 (1981).
13. See P. KAuPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTrrTimoN 47 (1964). See also Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64
(1878).
14. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 819. James Madison stated that "[t]here is not a
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interfer-
ence with it, would be a most flagrant usurpation." THE COMPLETE MADISON, His BASIc
WRTINGS 306 (S. Padover ed. 1973).
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge and others, A Committee of
the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in T. JEFFERSON, THE PORTA-
BLE THoMAs JEFFERSON 303, 303 (M. Peterson ed. 1975). Jefferson asserted:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God; that he owes account to none other for this faith or his worship; that the
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions, - I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of
separation between church and State.
Id.
16. See P. KAUPER, supra note 13, at 59; cf. Comment, Publicly-Funded Display of
Religious Symbols: The Nativity Scene Controversy, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 353, 354 (1982)
(citing only two themes, combining the strict separation and neutrality approaches).
17. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1947); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946). See also infra notes 21-31 and accompanying
text.
18. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). See also
infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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modation of religion. 9 The failure to adopt a consistent ap-
proach is evident in cases that purport to apply the strict
separation approach. 0
A. Strict Separation of Church and State
The stern approach to the establishment clause requires
strict separation of church and state and therefore forbids gov-
ernment action in support of religion.21 This fundamental con-
cept of strict separation of church and state found its first nota-
ble expression in Everson v. Board of Education.2 Everson
sustained the constitutionality of a New Jersey law providing
free bus transportation to school children, including pupils of
parochial schools.28 The Court concluded that this statute was a
valid general-public welfare measure designed to safeguard
school children traveling between their homes and schools.2
Justice Black, writing for the majority, interpreted the es-
tablishment clause to mean at least that
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. . . . In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State.""'
Justice Black concluded that the first amendment erected a high
and impregnable wall which cannot be breached." This wall was
not breached in Everson because the purpose of the legisla-
tion - safety of school children on their way to and from
19. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-72 (1970); Zorach v. Clausen,
343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). See also infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding constitutional-
ity of a New Jersey statute that provided free bus transportation for parochial school
students).
21. P. KAMPEM, supra note 13, at 59. According to Professor Kauper, the key to this
approach, which emerged from Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), is that
"government cannot by its programs, policies, or laws do anything to aid or support
religion or religious activities." P. KAIPKR, supra note 13, at 61.
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 16-18. The Court upheld the statute even though parochial schools indi-
rectly benefited from it.
25. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
26. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 18.
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school - was sufficiently secular. 7 The religious institution de-
rived no direct benefit.
In McCollum v. Board of Education,"5 the Court applied
the strict separation standard of Everson and held that a re-
leased-time program, which utilized public school classrooms for
religious instruction, was unconstitutional.2 ' The Court con-
cluded that the state provided an impermissible aid to sectarian
groups by providing pupils for religious classes through the use
of the state's compulsory attendance laws.30 The "First Amend-
ment has erected a wall between church and state which must be
kept high and impregnable. 3 1
B. Neutrality
The neutrality theme of the establishment clause requires
that government conduct have a secular purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.2 The Court
affirmed this principle in Abington School District v.
Schempp,s which involved a first amendment challenge to a
Pennsylvania statute that required a reading from the Bible and
a recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the opening of the school
day. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, concluded that these
religious exercises required by the state were in violation of the
first amendment's command that government maintain strict
neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion."
27. Id. at 16-18. The four dissenting Justices in Everson agreed with the majority's
reasoning regarding strict separation, but they concluded that the New Jersey statute
breached this standard. The state was promoting religion by providing public money to
defray the costs of parochial education. Id at 45-46.
28. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
29. Id. at 212.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. P. KAuPER, supra note 13, at 64-67. The critical difference between the strict
separation approach and the neutrality approach is that the strict separation approach is
directed only at inquiring whether government is acting in aid of religion. In contrast,
the neutrality approach is additionally concerned with whether government laws or pro-
grams hinder religion. Id. at 66-67. See generally McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
445 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws).
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. Id. at 226. If the purpose or primary effect of the government action is either the
advancement or the inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds legislative power.
Id. at 222.
1984]
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C. Accommodation
Before Lynch v. Donnelly" the Supreme Court did not ex-
plicitly endorse the accommodation approach." Recent deci-
sions, however, reflect the emerging view that government con-
duct acknowledging or benefiting religion is not a per se
violation of the establishment clause.3 7
The approach of the Court in Zorach v. Clauson" evidences
a recognition of the interrelationship between church and state
and permits government to accommodate the religious interests
of the people.39 In Zorach, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a released-time program in which students left the school
buildings and grounds for religious instruction at religious cen-
ters .4  The Court found that by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, the state respects the "religious nature
of our people. . .[and] . . .accommodates the public service to
their religious needs. 41
Even though Sunday remains a day of religious significance
for many, in McGowan v. Maryland42 the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of Sunday closing laws.43 Reasoning that the stat-
utes had a secular purpose, namely providing for a uniform day
of rest, the Court acknowledged that the concerns of religion
and government may overlap." Indeed, in upholding property
tax exemptions for properties used solely for religious purposes,
35. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
36. Prior decisions recognized the interrelationship between church and state. See
infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. However, the Lynch decision represents the
first time the Court has interpreted the Constitution as mandating accommodation be-
tween church and state. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
37. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of a plan
by which church-related colleges were permitted to borrow money, at favorable rates of
interest, for the purpose of constructing buildings for secular use); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding a federal statute that made federal grants for construc-
tion of buildings available to sectarian colleges); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (upholding tax exemptions for buildings used for religious worship).
38. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
39. Id. at 312-14.
40. Id. at 315.
41. Id. at 313-14.
42. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
43. Id. at 452.
44. Id. at 461-62.
[Vol. 5:81
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the Court, in Walz v. Tax Commission,5 stated that "[n]o per-
fect or absolute separation is really possible.""'
III. Current Standards
A. The Lemon v. Kurtzman Test
The analyses in McGowan v. Maryland,'4 Abington School
District v. Schempp,"s and Walz v. Tax Commission" were
combined in Lemon v. Kurtzman"0 to form the current estab-
lishment clause test." The three-prong test provides that state
action will survive an establishment clause challenge if (1) it has
a secular purpose; (2) it has a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.2 Applying this
test, the Court in Lemon held unconstitutional Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania statutes that provided salary supplements to
teachers in private schools.53 The Court determined that the
statutes did have a secular purpose, namely to enhance the qual-
45. 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding constitutionality of a New York statute granting
property tax exemptions to property used solely for religious worship).
46. Id. at 670.
47. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
48. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
49. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which upheld Sunday closing laws,
was the Supreme Court's earliest articulation of what was later incorporated as the first
prong of the modern establishment clause test. The state's secular purpose in providing a
uniform day of rest overrode any indirect benefit derived by particular religious sects. Id.
at 444-45.
In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court required that,
in addition to a secular purpose, the state action must have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. Id. at 222. This was later incorporated as the second
prong of the modern establishment clause test.
In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court upheld a New York statute
granting property tax exemptions to property used solely for religious worship. The
Court reasoned that exempting this property would afford a lesser degree of governmen-
tal entanglement with religion than would taxing the organizations that owned the prop-
erty. Id. at 674. This prohibition of excessive governmental entanglement with religious
organizations became the final prong of the modern establishment clause test.
52. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
53. Id. at 625. In addition to supplementing teachers' salaries, the Pennsylvania
statute reimbursed the schools for the cost of textbooks and instructional materials in
specified secular subjects. Id. at 626.
7
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ity of secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory
attendance law. 4 The Court declined to decide whether the pri-
mary effect of the statutes was to advance religion.55 Neverthe-
less, it struck the statutes down because their cumulative effect
was to foster an excessive entanglement between government
and religion.56
In applying the first prong of the Lemon test, namely the
requirement of secular purpose, courts are usually willing to de-
fer to the stated purpose of the government conduct.57 There
are, however, some notable exceptions to this policy of defer-
ence. 5  These cases generally involve the use of patently religious
54. Id. at 613.
55. Id. at 613-14.
56. Id. at 614. The Court concluded that the statute required continuing govern-
ment control and surveillance by state authorities in order to ensure that state aid sup-
ported only secular education. This continuing involvement constituted excessive entan-
glement between government and religion. Id. at 619.
57. In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), the Court considered a constitutional challenge to a New York State statute with
the stated purpose of preserving a healthy and safe environment for all school children.
Id. at 773. The statute provided for maintenance and repair grants to nonpublic schools
and tuition reimbursements or tax relief to parents whose children attended nonpublic
schools. Id. at 762-67. However, although acknowledging the secular legitimacy of the
state purpose, the Court nevertheless found the statute violative of the effect prong of
the Lemon test. Id. at 780-89.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court noted that the stated pur-
pose of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing salary supplements to teach-
ers in nonpublic schools was to enhance the quality of secular education in all schools
covered by compulsory attendance laws. Id. at 613. However, the statutes were held un-
constitutional based on the entanglement prong. See supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
In Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 987 (1980), the school district's stated purpose for the singing of Christmas carols at
holiday assembly programs was the advancement of the students' knowledge of the role
of religion in the cultural development of civilization. Id. at 1314. The court held this
was not a violation of either the establishment clause or the free exercise clause. Id. at
1318-19.
In Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court held that the inclusion of
a nativity scene in a holiday display on a public parkland had a secular purpose, namely
to bolster tourism and to commemorate the traditional and historic aspects of the na-
tional holiday of Christmas. Id. at 69. Despite this secular purpose, the action violated
the entanglement prong of the test. Id. at 67.
58. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court rejected
the argument that Bible readings could be justified as an effort to promote the secular
purpose of teaching moral values. Id. at 223-24.
In Gilfellan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 987 (1981), the city financed the construction of a platform for the celebration of a
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/3
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symbols." Thus, for example, the Supreme Court in Stone v.
Graham0 reversed a state court judgment that upheld a law re-
quiring that plaques displaying the Ten Commandments be
posted in every public schoolroom. The avowed secular purpose
was to illustrate the significance of the Ten Commandments in
the development of Western legal codes and law." The Court
stated that the Ten Commandments is "undeniably a sacred
text," and that "no legislative recitation of supposed secular
purposes can blind us to the fact." 2 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the preeminent purpose was plainly religious in
nature.6
Government action must have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion in order to satisfy the second
prong of the Lemon test." The Supreme Court has upheld state
action when the primary effect does not advance religion al-
though some benefit may be derived by a religious organiza-
tion." In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
papal mass. Rejecting the city's contention that the platform was erected as a safety
measure, the court held that this was only an incidental secular purpose, and therefore,
the action violated the establishment clause. Id. at 934.
In Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981),
the court held that North Carolina's use of a nondenominational prayer on the reverse
side of the official state map violated the establishment clause. The stated purpose was
to promote highway safety. The court concluded that the prayer was undeniably reli-
gious in nature and the state, under the establishment clause, was prohibited from em-
ploying religious means when secular means were sufficient. Id. at 1020.
In Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 539, 463 P.2d 360 (1969), appeal dismissed sub.
nom., Eugene Sand and Gravel v. Lowe, 397 U.S. 591 (1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042
(1970), the court held the placing of a lighted cross in a city park violated the establish-
ment clause. Although the avowed purpose was to promote business in the downtown
area during the Christmas season, the court held this insufficient, reasoning that the
primary purpose was to give preferential treatment to the religious symbol of the major-
ity. Id., 463 P.2d at 362.
59. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state required
prayers at the opening of the school day); Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 539, 463 P.2d
360 (1969), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Eugene Sand and Gravel v. Lowe, 397 U.S. 591
(1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970) (city erected a lighted cross in a city park
during the Christmas season).
60. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
61. Id. at 41.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 41-43.
64. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
65. See generally Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding constitutionality
of a plan by which church-related colleges were permitted to borrow money, at favorable
9
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v. Nyquist,6 the Court explained that state action violates the
effects test if it has the direct and immediate effect of advancing
religion;67 there is no violation when the effect is remotely and
incidentally advantageous to religious institutions.6
After passing the secular purpose and the primary effect
prongs of the Lemon test, the state action must, additionally,
not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. This "exces-
sive entanglement" prong measures the degree of involvement
between church and state, and it prohibits state action that calls
"for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermis-
sible entanglement."' 9 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, ° the Court also
included a second part to the entanglement inquiry, namely
whether the government action may result in intensified political
fragmentation along religious lines. 1 In Nyquist, however, the
Court concluded that although the prospect for political divi-
siveness along religious lines alone may not invalidate state ac-
tion, it is "certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored. '72
rates of interest, for the purpose of constructing buildings for secular use); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding a federal statute that made federal grants
for construction of buildings available to sectarian colleges); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemptions for buildings used for religious worship).
66. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
67. Id. at 774.
68. Id. at 774-89. When the government attempted to reimburse the parents of pa-
rochial school students for the tuition they paid, the religious schools became more at-
tractive as an alternative to public education. This was held to be a direct benefit to the
religious institution.
69. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S 664, 675 (1970). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 619-20 (1971).
70. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
71. Id. at 623. Because the statutes permitting the salary supplements for private
school teachers required annual appropriations, the Court feared that candidates and
voters would be divided along religious lines. Id.
72. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798
(1973). Like the statutes in Lemon, the statutes involved in Nyquist also required annual
appropriations to reimburse parents of private school children for tuition payments and
to provide direct money grants to private schools for maintenance and equipment. Most
of the schools involved were parochial schools. Once again the Court feared political divi-
siveness along religious lines as pressure increased for a larger amount of funds.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/3
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B. Alternatives to Lemon: Strict Scrutiny and Historical
Analysis
In two recent establishment clause cases - Larson v. Va-
lente 7 and Marsh v. Chambers7 4 - the Supreme Court did not
apply the three-part Lemon test.75 Larson involved an establish-
ment clause challenge to a Minnesota charitable solicitations act
which provided that religious organizations receiving more than
fifty percent of their total contributions from members or affili-
ated organizations were exempt from the registration and re-
porting requirements of the act.7 6 The Court reasoned that the
Lemon test was intended to apply only to laws affording uniform
benefits to all religions and not to state action that discriminates
among religions." Instead, it held that any statute granting a
denominational preference must be subject to strict scrutiny by
the courtss.7  Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held the statute
73. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
74. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
75. In two other recent establishment clause decisions, however, the Court did apply
the Lemon test. In Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), the Court upheld a Minne-
sota statute that allows state taxpayers, when computing their state income tax, to de-
duct expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their chil-
dren attending elementary or secondary school. Id. at 3065. The statute satisfied the
purpose prong of the test because the tax deduction had a secular purpose, namely to
ensure that the state's citizenry was well educated. Moreover, the deduction did not have
the primary effect of advancing religion, because it was available to all parents whether
their children attended private or public schools, and any benefit received by sectarian
schools was incidental. Id. at 3066-68. Finally, the fact that, under the statute, state
officials must determine whether particular textbooks qualify for tax deductions was held
an insufficient basis for finding excessive entanglement. Id. at 3071.
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982), the Court held unconstitutional a
Massachusetts statute that vested in the governing bodies of churches and schools the
power to veto applications for licenses to sell liquor when the premises were within a 500
foot radius of the church or school. Id. at 117. The purpose prong of the Lemon test was
violated because, in the Court's opinion, the avowed purpose, namely to protect the spir-
itual and educational centers from the danger associated with liquor serving establish-
ments, could be accomplished by other means. Id. at 123-24. Because the veto power of
the churches was standardless, the Court reasoned that this power could be exercised for
explicitly religious goals. Id. at 125. Thus, the statute could have the primary and princi-
pal effect of advancing religion. Id. at 126. The statute also failed the entanglement
prong. Zoning, the Court said, is traditionally a governmental function. By allowing
churches to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses, the church became enmeshed in the
process of government. Id. at 126-27.
76. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. at 230.
77. Id. at 252.
78. Id. at 246.
1984]
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unconstitutional because the state failed to show that the stat-
ute's fifty percent rule was closely tailored to the avowed state
purpose of preventing fraudulent solicitations.7 9
In Marsh,80 the Court applied neither the Lemon test nor
the strict scrutiny approach of Larson. Rather, relying on an his-
torical analysis, the Court approved the continuing use of a
chaplain at legislative sessions in Nebraska."1 Citing the contin-
ued use for over two hundred years of prayer in congressional
sessions and other public bodies,82 the Court noted that the
practice "has become part of the fabric of our society."8 As
such, it is not an establishment of religion, but rather an "ac-
knowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country. '84
IV. Lynch v. Donnelly
A. Facts
For over forty years the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island set
up and maintained traditional displays and decorations through-
out the city during the Christmas season.85 One such display was
maintained by the city in Hodgson Park, which is privately
owned property situated in the heart of Pawtucket's downtown
commercial district.86 Each year the city, with the owner's per-
mission, entered Hodgson Park in November and erected a
lighted Christmas display. The city owned the lights, figures,
and buildings that made up the display.8 7 The display included
a nativity scene as well as a Santa's house, carolers, a lighted
Christmas tree, and other traditional holiday symbols. The
figures in the display, including those in the nativity scene, were
life-sized.8 When the creche was first purchased, it cost
$1365.00; erecting and dismantling the creche cost the city ap-
79. Id. at 248-51.
80. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
81. Id. at 3335-37.
82. Id. at 3332-34.
83. Id. at 3336.
84. Id.
85. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358 (1984).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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proximately twenty dollars per year. In addition, there was a
minimal charge for the electricity that lit the scene.8 City work-
ers or city-paid contractors performed the set-up and disman-
tling work.'0
One week before Christmas in 1980, the plaintiff taxpayers
brought suit in federal district court against the city to enjoin
the erection of the nativity scene as a violation of the establish-
ment clause."
B. The Lower Court Decisions
The district court found that including a nativity scene in a
publicly funded Christmas display violated the establishment
clause.'2 It began a consideration of the merits by rejecting the
defendant's characterization of the nativity scene as a largely
secular symbol which did not violate the establishment clause.'
The court reasoned that because the scene is a direct representa-
tion of the Biblical account of the birth of Christ, it is more im-
mediately connected to the religious meaning of Christmas than,
for example, Santa Claus.' The court also rejected the city's ar-
gument that because Christmas has a secular dimension, the city
is permitted to celebrate its sectarian as well as its secular
aspects."
The district court then continued to apply the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test.6 The court was not persuaded by the city's ar-
gument that the display had a primary purpose that was secu-
89. Id.
90. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-55 (D.R.I. 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1059
(1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
91. Id. at 1154.
92. Id. at 1181.
93. Id. at 1165-68.
94. Id. at 1166.
95. Id. at 1164. The court stated that Christmas has a secular dimension exemplified
by Santa Claus and such nontheological themes as good will, peace on earth, and com-
mercialism. Id. at 1167. Despite this secular dimension, the court concluded that the
holiday has not lost its religious significance. Id. at 1163. The court further indicated
that "[a]s long as there are also strong secular elements, the government may involve
itself with the activity if it limits itself to promoting only those elements." Id. at 1164
(emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 1168-80. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for an explanation
of the Lemon test.
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lar - whether economic, traditional, or cultural.97 Rather, the
court concluded that by including a religious symbol in its dis-
play,"s the city's purpose was to support and approve the major-
ity's religious beliefs. 9" The court also found that the require-
ments of the primary effect prong of Lemon were not met.'"0
The court determined that the appearance of official sponsor-
ship of Christian beliefs that the creche conveys, confers more
than a remote and incidental benefit on Christianity.0 1 Finally,
the court found that there was no excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religious organizations. 10 However, the
city's ownership and display of the nativity scene engendered di-
vision along religious lines. 03 This divisiveness alone would not
have resulted in a finding of an establishment clause violation.'0"
But this divisiveness, together with the court's earlier findings of
an impermissible purpose and effect, led the court to conclude
that the establishment clause had been violated. 0 5
The First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.'" 6 Al-
though it approved of the district court's application of the
Lemon test,'07 the court of appeals relied on Larson v. Va-
lente,'08 which was decided after the district court decision in
Lynch v. Donnelly.'"9 The court reasoned that Larson required a
97. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1173-74.
98. Id. at 1165-68. The court found that the nativity scene had retained its religious
significance and meaning unlike other traditional holiday symbols such as Santa Claus.
Id. at 1166-67.
99. Id. at 1173.
100. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for an explanation of the "pri-
mary effect" prong of the Lemon test.
101. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1174-78. In the court's view, the creche
remained undeniably a religious symbol. Its inclusion in the city sponsored display had
the effect of a government endorsement of the religious beliefs it represented.
102. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text for an explanation of this third
prong of the Lemon test.
103. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1179-80.
104. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
105. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1179-80.
106. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), afg 525 F. Supp. 1150
(D.P.I. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
107. Id. at 1033-34.
108. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
109. The district court decided the case in November, 1981. Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982), was argued on December 9, 1981, and decided April 21, 1982. Donnelly
v. Lynch was argued before the First Circuit Court of Appeals on April 7, 1981, and
decided November 3, 1982.
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strict scrutiny analysis in the Pawtucket case because "the City's
ownership and use of the nativity scene is an act which discrimi-
nates between Christian and non-Christian religions . *..."11O
Because the court concluded that no legitimate secular purpose
was advanced by the city sponsorship of the nativity scene, the
action did not survive strict scrutiny."'
In dissent, Judge Campbell viewed the crbche in its context
and found it to be no more symbolically religious than Santa
Claus." 2 Indeed, he argued that it was totally inconsistent to
maintain Christmas as a national holiday and at the same time
forbid displays of this nature.113 Judge Campbell concluded that
when these religious symbols are "seasonally deployed without
accompanying religious ceremonies or message," they do not es-
tablish religion." 4
V. The Supreme Court Decision
A. Plurality Opinion
Notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the
Supreme Court's plurality opinion," written by Chief Justice
Burger, concluded that the City of Pawtucket had not violated
the establishment clause by including the creche in its annual
Christmas display.""
At the outset the Court explicitly rejected the "wall of sepa-
ration approach,"" 7 reasoning that the Constitution affirma-
tively mandates "accommodation of all religion, . . and forbids
hostility towards any [religion] ... The Chief Justice
110. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d at 1034.
111. Id. at 1035.
112. Id. at 1038-39.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1039.
115. Chief Justice Burger delivered the plurality opinion in which Justices White,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice O'Connor joined in the holding but filed her own
concurrence.
116. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984).
117. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "wall of
separation" approach. Although acknowledging that the metaphor serves as a useful re-
minder that the establishment clause forbids an established church, the Court stated
that it was not entirely an accurate description of the practical aspects of the relation-
ship that, in fact, exist between church and state. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
118. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359. See also supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text
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maintained that this interpretation was compatible with what
history revealed was the contemporaneous understanding of the
establishment clause.119 The Court viewed the First Congress'
employment of a congressional chaplain to offer daily prayers as
evidence of the "accommodations of religious belief intended by
the Framers."1 20 Pursuing this historical analysis, the Court
identified other examples of official government acknowledge-
ment of religion in American life since 1789,121 including the
declaration of Thanksgiving as a "national" holiday. 22 The
Court stated that in view of this history of pervasive governmen-
tal acknowledgement of religion, it has consistently declined to
take an absolutist view in establishment clause challenges.12 3
Rather, the Court viewed its prior decisions as focusing on
whether the challenged conduct "in reality . . . establishes a re-
ligion or religious faith, or tends to do so." 1 24
Nevertheless, the Court applied the three-part Lemon v.
Kurtzman test, which it maintained provided useful guidelines
for a discussion of the accommodation theory.
119. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359-60.
120. Id. See also Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (holding constitutional
the use of publicly compensated legislative chaplains).
121. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360-61. Examples referred to by the Court include "In
God We Trust" on coins, the words, "One nation under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance,
the use of public revenues to provide compensation for chaplains in Congress and the
Armed Services, the display of religious paintings in museums that receive government
subsidies, and Presidential Proclamations that commemorate the Jewish High Holy
Days. Id.
122. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360. In his dissent, Justice Brennan outlined the history
of the emergence of Christmas as a public holiday. This did not occur until the middle of
the nineteenth century. Indeed the colonists brought to this country differing views con-
cerning the celebration of the holiday. For example, the Massachusetts Colony made the
observance of Christmas Day by feasting or any other way an offense punishable by fine.
As increasing numbers of members of the Anglican, Dutch Reformed, and Roman Catho-
lic churches arrived, the practice of celebrating Christmas publicly grew. Id. at 1383-85.
In 1870, Congress, following the lead of 29 states made Christmas a holiday in the
District of Columbia. See Act of June 28, 1870, ch. 167, 16 Stat. 168 (1870). In 1885,
Congress provided for payment of federal employees on Christmas Day. See J. Res. 5,
48th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 Stat. 516 (1885).
There are in fact no "national" holidays. Congress has simply accomodated "to some
extent the opportunities of individuals to practice their religion." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at
1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If Congress made Christmas a national holiday, that
would raise a separate establishment clause question.
123. Id. at 1361.
124. Id. The Court cites Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970), as standing
for this proposition.
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in a case by case line drawing process.125 First, the Court con-
cluded that the city had a secular purpose. 2 The display was
sponsored to celebrate a national holiday and to depict the ori-
gins of that holiday.127 Furthermore, the Court concluded that
Lemon v. Kurtzman merely required a secular purpose, not ex-
clusively secular objectives.128
Next, the Court discussed the primary effect prong of the
Lemon test.1 29 The Court concluded that whatever benefit was
conferred on religion in general or the Christian faith in particu-
lar was indirect, remote, and incidental.'" It was no more an
advancement or endorsement of religion than the expenditure of
public funds for transportation of students to church-sponsored
schools upheld in Everson v. Board of Education,"'3 or the Sun-
day closing laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland,3 2 or the re-
leased-time program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson,5 5 or the exhi-
bition of religious paintings in government supported
museums.
1 3 4
The Court affirmed the district court's finding that there
was no excessive administrative entanglement due to the city's
sponsorship of the creche. " 5 The cost of maintaining the display
was minimal and no ongoing interaction between church and
125. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
126. Id. at 1363.
127. Id. The Court rejected the district court's inference that, because of the reli-
gious nature of the creche, the city had no secular purpose for the display. The focus was
on the creche in the context of the Christmas season and the national holiday it cele-
brates. Id.
128. Id. at 1363, n.6.
129. Id. at 1363-64.
130. Id. at 1364.
131. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
132. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
133. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
134. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361. The Court also cites Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116 (1982), and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), as examples of
state action that substantially aided religion and thus violated the establishment clause.
In Grendel's Den, churches were given the power to veto licenses to business establish-
ments serving alcoholic beverages, if the business sought to locate within 500 feet of the
religious institution. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 117. In McCollum, government
had impermissibly aided sectarian groups by providing pupils for their religious classes
through use of the state's compulsory public school machinery. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. at 212.
135. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
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state was necessary. 8 6 The Court, however, rejected the district
court's finding that the political divisiveness engendered by the
lawsuit was evidence of excessive entanglement.13 7 Reaffirming
that divisiveness alone cannot serve to invalidate otherwise per-
missible conduct, the Court emphasized that "[a] litigant can-
not, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, . . . create the
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of
entanglement. '"1 8
Justice Burger concluded by stating that if the presence of
the creche in this display violated the establishment clause, a
host of other official recognitions of our religious heritage were
equally offensive to the Constitution." 9 Such a holding would be
contrary to our history and to prior holdings. "1 0
B. Concurring Opinion
Although concurring in the plurality holding, Justice
O'Connor filed a separate opinion to "suggest a clarification of
the [Court's] establishment clause doctrine."'" According to
Justice O'Connor, the establishment clause prohibits the govern-
ment from making adherence to a religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community. 4 2 Government action runs
afoul of this prohibition if it fosters excessive entanglement with
religious institutions or endorses religion. " 8 Justice O'Connor
concluded that there was no excessive entanglement in this case
and concurred with the plurality's conclusion that divisiveness
alone is not an independent test of constitutionality. 4 There-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1365.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Court notes such official acknowledgments of Christmas as the declara-
tion of Christmas as a national holiday, and the singing of carols and hymns in public
schools and other public places. Id.
140. Id. at 1366.
141. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. Id. Justice O'Connor notes that excessive entanglement may interfere with the
independence of the religious institution or give the institution access to the government
that is not shared by nonadherents of the religion. Endorsement tends to divide the
community by making adherents of the endorsed religion insiders, and nonadherents,
outsiders in the political community. Id.
143. Id. at 1367-68.
144. Id. at 1367.
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fore, the central issue was whether Pawtucket endorsed Christi-
anity by including the creche in the city sponsored Christmas
display.14 5
In order to determine the existence of an "endorsement,"
Justice O'Connor used the purpose and effect prongs of the
Lemon test.14 The purpose prong inquiry involves whether the
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of reli-
gion. 1  The effect prong inquiry involves whether, irrespective
of the government's actual purpose, the practice in fact conveys
a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion. 4 8
Justice O'Connor applied the Lemon test and concluded
that the city had not endorsed a religion. This analysis turned
on recognizing that the creche was displayed in a context that
included other secular symbols, all intended to celebrate a na-
tional holiday. 4 9
The purpose prong was satisfied because Pawtucket did not
intend to convey any message endorsing Christianity, but rather
intended to celebrate a public holiday through the use of tradi-
tional symbols. 50 Furthermore, the inclusion of the creche also
satisfied the effect test.' 5' Viewing the creche in the context of
the entire display, Justice O'Connor concluded that displaying
and maintaining the creche was no more an endorsement of reli-
gion than other government actions previously upheld by the
Court. 52
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, 58 initially observed
that the majority had reached an essentially narrow decision
which only approved the inclusion of the creche in the "particu-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1368. See supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
148. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68. This inquiry is similar to Chief
Justice Burger's inquiry concerning whether the government action "in reality" estab-
lishes religion. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361.
149. Id. at 1369 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1368.
152. Id. at 1369.
153. Justice Brennan is joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
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lar holiday context in which the City of Pawtucket's nativity
scene appeared."' " Nevertheless, the dissent concluded that the
inclusion of other secular symbols did not negate the specific
Christian meaning of the creche, and, therefore, this action was
an impermissible endorsement of a particular faith.155
Unlike the majority, the dissent characterized the Lemon
test as the settled fundamental tool in establishment clause
cases, designed to ensure that religion and government remain
strictly apart.1"6 Applying the Lemon test, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the inclusion of a nativity scene did not reflect a
clearly secular purpose.1 57 Furthermore, the city's purpose can
be accomplished by other means.15 1 In order to comply with the
purpose test, Pawtucket's seasonal celebration must "at least be
non-denominational and not serve to promote religion."159
Next, Justice Brennan maintained that the "sectarian na-
ture of the nativity scene has the effect of placing the govern-
ment's imprimatur on the particular religious beliefs exemplified
by the creche."1 60 This imprimatur, he concluded, violates the
effect test because it conferred a significant benefit to a particu-
lar religion, which was precisely the sort of chauvinism that the
establishment clause was intended to prohibit. 61
Agreeing with the majority that there was no administrative
entanglement present, the dissent took note of the divisiveness
154. Id. at 1370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1371 n.2. Justice Brennan did recognize certain circumstances when ac-
commodation between church and state is permissible. First, government may act to ac-
commodate the opportunities of individuals to practice their religion. Id. at 1381. This
principle would justify the declaration of December 25th as a public holiday. Id. Second,
while a particular practice may have derived from religious motivations, it is permissible
for government to pursue the practice when it is continued today solely for secular rea-
sons. Id. Finally, those practices by which government has long acknowledged religion,
such as the designation of "In God We Trust" as our national motto, now serve a secular
purpose. This, together with their long history, gives them a secular meaning, making
them constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1381-82.
157. Id. at 1372-73. Justice Brennan noted that several representatives of Pawtuck-
et's business community testified that the display would attract shoppers to the down-
town area even without the creche. Id. at 1373 n.5.
158. Id. at 1372.
159. Id. at 1373.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1374.
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created by the initiation of this suit. 62 This was a warning signal
that "values embodied in the Establishment Clause are at
risk."'68
Turning to an analysis of the majority opinions, Justice
Brennan stated that, in focusing on the nativity scene in the
context of the holiday celebration, the majority ignored the
clearly religious meaning of the creche.'" Thus, although Christ-
mas is a public holiday, it does not follow that government was
free to participate in its sectarian as well as its secular aspects.'"1
Justice Brennan, however, concluded that some official acknowl-
edgement of religion was inevitable, but cautioned against
"overly broad acknowledgements .. . that may imply govern-
mental favoritism toward one set of religious beliefs."'" Justice
Brennan identified three guidelines for government to follow to
satisfy the establishment clause. 167 First, government may ac-
commodate, to some extent, the opportunity for individuals to
practice their religion.'" Second, even if a particular practice
may have previously had a religious connotation, the govern-
ment may continue the practice today for purely secular rea-
sons. 1' 9 Third, the government may recognize aspects of national
history and culture.17 0 Justice Brennan concluded that the
creche did not satisfy any of these guidelines.17' There was no
historical evidence that either the founding fathers or the public
in general supported such a municipally funded display.7 2 Fi-
nally, the dissent concluded that the city's action was a "coer-
162. Id. at 1374-75.
163. Id. at 1374.
164. Id. at 1376.
165. Id. at 1377-78.
166. Id. at 1380.
167. Id. at 1381.
168. Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)). Justice Brennan noted, as
an additional example, that the government had declared Christmas a public holiday.
Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited as
examples McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and the declaration of
Thanksgiving as a public holiday. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1381-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing as examples
Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), and the use of "In God We Trust" on United
States currency).
171. Id. at 1382.
172. Id. at 1385-86.
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cive, though perhaps small, step toward establishing the secta-
rian preferences of the majority at the expense of the
minority.' 173
VI. Analysis
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 74 the Supreme Court signals the ex-
pansion of a significant trend in the Court's changing attitude
toward church and state relations. Approving the inclusion of a
nativity scene in a government sponsored Christmas display, the
Court indicates that the symbolic wall of separation can be
breached. 1 5 Indeed, according to Chief Justice Burger, the wall
is merely a "useful figure of speech.' 76 The Constitution man-
dates accommodation,'7 not merely tolerance of all religions. Al-
though earlier decisions foreshadowed this view, there is no
doubt that the Lynch decision is the Court's first explicit ex-
pression of the accommodation approach. 7 8
A. The Plurality's Use of History and Precedent
Previous decisions, although not expressly approving the ac-
commodation approach, recognized the impossibility of a total
separation of church and state. 79 As Chief Justice Burger indi-
cates in Lynch, the Court has in the past refused to take a rigid
approach in establishment clause analyses. 80 Beginning with
Everson v. Board of Education,'' the Court has consistently up-
held governmental action when it indirectly benefited religious
institutions. Thus, activities such as released-time programs for
173. Id. at 1386.
174. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
175. Id. at 1359.
176. Id.
177. Id. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
178. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359. See also Walz v.. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670
(1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451-52 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312-14 (1952). These decisions, although not stating that the Constitution mandates
accommodation, nevertheless recognized that absolute separation of church and state is
not possible and that some interrelationship is inevitable.
179. See, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
760-61 (1973). See also supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
180. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361.
181. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a New Jersey statute giving aid to parochial
schools for transporting children to school).
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religious instruction held outside the public schools 1M3 and Sun-
day closing laws18s have been upheld against establishment
clause challenges. Furthermore, statutes that confer a more di-
rect benefit on religious institutions, such as the exemption of
church owned property from the payment of property taxes,
have also been upheld.'"
Moreover, the Lynch decision is not the first time the Court
has upheld governmental conduct that utilizes public funds for
patently religious activities. As Chief Justice Burger observes in
Lynch, government has long recognized, and in effect, subsidized
holidays with religious significance by releasing government em-
ployees from duties on holidays, such as Christmas, while still
paying their salaries with public revenue.185 These same public
funds are used to pay for congressional chaplains who offer
prayers at the beginning of legislative sessions. 186
However, the holding in Lynch goes further than previous
decisions. By approving the expenditure of public funds for the
inclusion in Pawtucket's holiday display of a scene so closely as-
sociated with a particular religious belief, the Court implicitly
indicates that government action may constitutionally benefit
one religion to the exclusion of others. Furthermore, Pawtucket's
avowed objectives for erecting the entire display could be real-
ized without the creche.1 87 Thus, there was no need in this case
for the municipality to support religion, either directly or indi-
rectly. Government objectives in prior decisions, on the other
hand, could not have been accomplished without some indirect
benefit to religious institutions in general.'"
182. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
183. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
184. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The rationale is that because
religious institutions are exempt from the financial burden of property taxes, they have
more funds available for religious pursuits.
185. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360.
186. The use of public funds for legislative chaplains was upheld in Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
187. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1373 n.5.
188. For example, the objective of providing a uniform day of rest could not have
been achieved without some indirect benefit to religion once Sunday was chosen as that
day. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Similarly, the public's legitimate interest in safe transportation for all school chil-
dren could not have been accomplished without providing some program which benefited
parochial as well as public school students.
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Despite the Court's conclusion that its holding is in har-
mony with prior decisions, its historical analysis is unprece-
dented. A municipally sponsored creche is not a part of our
"shared national heritage" to the same extent as legislative
chaplains and Sunday closing laws.189 In both Marsh v. Cham-
bers19° and McGowan v. Maryland,19 the historical analyses fo-
cused on concrete and specific evidence of the history and public
acceptance of the particular practices being challenged.19e In
Lynch, no specific evidence was presented concerning the his-
tory of publicly funded Christmas displays or the history of the
public celebration of Christmas."'3
One of the principal problems in holding the inclusion of
the creche in Pawtucket's display constitutional is the Court's
reliance on Christmas as a "national" holiday.'" Congress estab-
lished Christmas as a legal public holiday for federal employees
and residents of the District of Columbia.1 95 This falls far short
of designating Christmas as a nationwide holiday. 96 The desig-
nation of a day of such religious significance as a national holi-
day may, in itself, raise an establishment clause problem. How-
ever, even if this problem is overcome, it does not necessarily
follow that using public funds to display any symbol of the holi-
day is likewise constitutional.19 This rationale could lead to
189. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1383 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan criti-
cizes the adequacy of the majority's historical analysis).
190. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
191. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
192. See Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3332-36 (outlining the history of the use
of legislative chaplains); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 444-45 (tracing the develop-
ment of Sunday closing laws as an outgrowth of other public health and safety
measures).
193. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1383 n.25 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
pointed out that neither the petitioners nor their supporting amici could provide any
information regarding the history of the publicly funded display of nativity scenes. Id.
Moreover, the recognition of Christmas as a public holiday is a recent phenomenon, be-
gun in the middle of the 19th century, unlike the use of legislative chaplains which dates
from the first Congress. Id. at 1383.
194. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362, 1365, 1369. See supra note 122.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982); 5 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (West Supp. 1984).
196. See supra note 122.
197. In his dissent, Justice Brennan reasons "that government may recognize the
holiday's traditional, secular elements of giftgiving, public festivities, and community
spirit, does not mean that government may indiscriminately embrace the distinctively
sectarian aspects of the holiday." Id. at 1378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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greater government entanglement with religion than was in-
tended whenever an action is couched in the guise of celebrating
a public holiday.
The Court's comparison of the Pawtucket creche to a dis-
play of artistic masterpieces with religious themes in publicly
subsidized museums or the study of the Bible in literature clas-
ses1 98 is unsound. The paintings are being exhibited not for their
religious symbolism, but because of their artistic value. Simi-
larly, in a literature class the Bible is considered solely for its
literary value rather than for the particular religious beliefs it
espouses. Finally, the display of paintings in a museum and the
study of the Bible are not confined to a single holiday season
with religious significance. The Pawtucket creche plays no com-
parable secular role because it is not displayed for its aesthetic
qualities.
B. The Uncertainty Following Lynch v. Donnelly1 99
Although it is clear that the Court has, in dictum, expressly
approved the accommodation approach,00 the scope of the hold-
ing in Lynch is uncertain. Thus, the question of whether a pub-
licly funded creche standing by itself or a private creche dis-
played by itself on public property would be constitutional was
left undecided.
This uncertainty is evident in two lower court decisions de-
cided after Lynch - McCreary v. Stone2 01 and ACLU v. City
of Birmingham.202 Both decisions involved the display of a
creche by itself. In McCreary, the Second Circuit reversed a dis-
trict court decision, holding that the Village of Scarsdale could
not prohibit private citizens from displaying a creche on a public
parkland during the Christmas season.203 Applying the Lemon v.
Kurtzman "guidelines," the Second Circuit reasoned that if the
Lynch creche, which was purchased, erected, displayed, and
198. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361, 1362, 1364.
199. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
200. Id. at 1359-61.
201. No. 83-9052 (2d Cir. June 21, 1984), cert. granted sub nom, Board of Trustees,
Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 53 U.S.L.W. 1060 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1984)(No. 84-277).
202. 53 U.S.L.W. 2111 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 1984).
203. McCreary v. Stone, No. 83-9052, slip op. at 4661 (2d Cir. June 21, 1984), rev'g
575 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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sponsored by Pawtucket, was not construed by the Supreme
Court to have the effect of impermissibly advancing religion,
then the Scarsdale creche, which was purchased, erected, dis-
played and sponsored by private citizens, could not be viewed as
violative of the establishment clause either.0 4
A district court in ACLU v. City of Birmingham, however,
took a much more restrictive view of the holding in Lynch, rea-
soning that Birmingham's display of the solitary creche was un-
constitutional because it was not part of a larger holiday display
which included other secular decorations.0 5
In Stone v. Graham20 6 and Abington School District v.
Schempp,0 7 the Supreme Court noted that the context in which
a religious practice occurs may determine whether government
sponsorship of that practice violates the establishment clause. 08
In both decisions, the Court indicated that the study of the Ten
Commandments or the Bible in public schools was permissible
under the establishment clause if the study was integrated into
the school curriculum. Both Chief Justice Burger's opinion and
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch focus on the creche in
the context of the public holiday it celebrates, rather than on its
inclusion in a display with other secular symbols. 209 It is possible
to conclude that the display of a religious symbol, such as the
creche, is only constitutional in the context of a national holi-
day. Thus, the setting, either by itself or surrounded by other
secular symbols, may be immaterial. Following this interpreta-
tion, the display of other religious symbols not similarly identi-
fied with public holidays, would be unconstitutional. Thus, for
example, the publicly funded display of a cross during the
Easter holidays would violate the establishment clause, because
204. Id. at 4681-82.
205. 53 U.S.L.W. 2111 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 1984).
206. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
207. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
208. The Court in Stone struck down a Tennessee statute requiring the posting of
the Ten Commandments on classroom walls. The court found this impermissible in that
this religious text was not integrated into the school curriculum, but rather was used for
its religious message. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 42. In Schempp, the Court held un-
constitutional mandatory Bible reading at the opening of each school day. Nevertheless,
the court stated that this did not bar the study of the Bible as literature in a literature
class. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-25.
209. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362, 1368.
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Easter is not a national holiday.
Perhaps the most significant impact of the Lynch decision
involves the extent to which the tripartite test articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman210 remains the standard applicable to fu-
ture establishment clause cases. As Justice Brennan observes in
his dissenting opinion, the Court's reference to the Lemon test
as a useful guideline suggests a less than vigorous commitment
to Lemon's standards.211 This weak commitment is inconsistent
with previous decisions. Ever since its initial formulation, the
Lemon test has been regarded as the fundamental tool of estab-
lishment clause analysis. Other opinions have described the test
in mandatory terms.1 2 Marsh v. Chambers213 was the only case
in which the Court did not apply the Lemon analysis since the
test's inception.2 1 4 In Larson v. Valente,1 5 the Court used both
a strict scrutiny analysis21  and the Lemon test.217
Although the Lynch decision does not reject the Lemon test
outright, it does suggest that future establishment clause cases
will be dealt with differently. Rather than invalidating all gov-
ernment conduct that may advance all religions or one religion
in particular, the Court will scrutinize the challenged conduct to
determine if "in reality, it establishes a religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so. ''21a Thus, Lynch does not frame any
fixed per se rule. Clearly some relationship between religion, or
religious institutions and government, is permissible. It appears
that each challenge will require a case by case determination,
depending upon the circumstances of the particular relationship
between church and state.
By expressly refusing to be confined to one particular
210. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text for an ex-
planation of the Lemon test.
211. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1370-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at n.2 (citing Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) and Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)).
213. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
214. In Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court traced the history of
the use of legislative chaplains dating back to colonial times in holding constitutional a
Nebraska statute that used public funds for salaries of legislative chaplains.
215. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
216. Id. at 246-51.
217. Id. at 251-55.
218. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361.
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test, 19 the Court, in Lynch, abandoned the comparative cer-
tainty of the Lemon analysis for the undefined territory of case
by case decision making. It is difficult to determine what the
permissible level of government advancement of religion will be.
Rather than clarifying an already sensitive area, the Court ap-
pears to have adopted an even more imprecise approach.2 0 De-
spite the Court's refusal to be bound by a single test, the Court
nevertheless utilizes the Lemon analysis in holding Pawtucket's
creche constitutional. 21 In doing so, the Court clarifies the
Lemon standards, while diminishing their impact.
First, the secular purpose prong of the Lemon analysis is
satisfied when the challenged legislation or conduct has a secular
purpose. This is because the purpose inquiry, according to Chief
Justice Burger, focuses on whether the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations.2 2  Justice
O'Connor focuses on whether the government's actual purpose
is to endorse religion.23 In either case, it appears that a primary
secular purpose is no longer required.224 One secular purpose will
suffice despite the fact that there may be some religious pur-
poses as well. Furthermore, whether the objectives could have
been accomplished by other means is immaterial to the
analysis.22 5
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Binford v. Eckels, No. H-82-0035 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 1984) (available
Aug. 9, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File), which aptly illustrates the uncer-
tainty concerning the appropriate criteria to be used after Lynch in establishment clause
cases. The district court utilized the Lemon guidelines as well as an historical and a
strict scrutiny analysis to hold unconstitutional the placement of two crosses and a Star
of David in a meditation area located in a public park.
221. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
222. Id. at 1362.
223. Id. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
224. Compare Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363 n.6 (stating that "a secular purpose ... is
all that Lemon requires") (emphasis added) with Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 (stating that "a clearly secular purpose is required")
(emphasis added).
225. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 456 U.S. 116 (1982). In Larkin, the court held
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that vested in the governing bodies of schools
and churches the power to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses for premises within 500
feet of a school or church by objecting to the license applications. The statute failed the
purpose prong of the Lemon analysis because the valid secular legislative purposes could
have been accomplished by other means. Id. at 123-24. The court in Lynch rejects this
approach. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363 n.7.
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Second, it is clear that when the government action has the
effect of substantially aiding religion, the action will fail the pri-
mary effect prong of the Lemon analysis. However, the Court
correctly recognized that on occasion some advancement of reli-
gion will result from governmental action and that previous de-
cisions have upheld the constitutionality of legislation that con-
ferred more than an indirect benefit on religious institutions.2
Nevertheless, the degree of advancement permissible under
Lynch is unclear.
Finally, the Court reaffirms its position that divisiveness
alone cannot serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct
under the entanglement test.227 The Court goes even further by
stating that the divisiveness engendered by a lawsuit cannot be
used as evidence of excessive entanglement.2 8 Yet divisiveness
may already exist but not be publicly articulated until a lawsuit
is initiated.
VII. Conclusion
In Lynch v. Donnelly,2 9 the Supreme Court held that a mu-
nicipality did not violate the establishment clause when it set up
and maintained a creche. The decision will have a significant im-
pact on future establishment clause challenges. By expressly en-
dorsing the accommodation approach, the Court sanctioned gov-
ernment action that benefits religion. But, by failing to define a
more precise test and by further weakening the requirements of
the Lemon v. Kurtzman analysis, the Court failed to alleviate
the difficulties in establishment clause analyses. Determining the
constitutionality of state action in this sensitive area on a case
by case basis increases the likelihood of misapplication of vague
standards. A more precise test is desirable.
Naomi Katz
226. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1369.
227. Id. at 1364-65.
228. Id. at 1365.
229. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
1984]
29
